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ABSTRACT: Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various ex-
perimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cog-
nitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she
proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs.
We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do
not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrabil-
ity; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrabil-
ity, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed
mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own
experiments, reported herein.
1. INTRODUCTION
Experimental results suggest that stored information relating shapes
and colors can affect one’s perceptual experience of color. For instance,
Delk & Fillenbaum (1965) found that participants match heart-shaped
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reddish-orange objects to a redder background than they do square-
shaped reddish-orange objects. Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that
this result and others provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive
penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a
mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs.
Cognitive penetrability has been of great interest to philosophers for
a variety of reasons. Philosophers share psychologists’ interest in the
relation of thought and perception and in cognitive architecture gen-
erally. But they concern themselves as well with the possible upshot
of cognitive penetrability for questions regarding, for example, percep-
tual justification and the objectivity of scientific theorizing (reviewed in
Stokes 2013). In addition, one of the studies Macpherson cites — con-
cerning perception and race (Levin & Banaji 2006, discussed below) —
is relevant to issues in social cognition and normative social theory of
more general significance.
In what follows, however, we argue, first, that the results on which
Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cog-
nitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive
penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her pro-
posed mechanism.
2. BACKGROUND
The term ‘cognitive penetrability’ was coined by Zenon Pylyshyn, who
characterizes the phenomenon as one where “the function [a system]
computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organ-
ism’s goals and beliefs.” (Pylyshyn 1999, p. 343) There has been some
debate concerning the most fruitful way to further gloss, or reframe,
what Pylyshyn puts his finger on. (Stokes 2013; Machery forthcoming)
We can work with Macpherson’s own characterization, applied by her
in particular to perceptual experience:
. . . perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable if it is
not possible for two subjects (or one subject at different
times) to have two different experiences on account of a
difference in their cognitive systems which makes this dif-
ference intelligible when certain facts about the case are
held fixed, namely, the nature of the [effect of the] proxi-
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mal stimulus on the sensory organ, the state of the sensory
organ, and the location of attentional focus of the subject.
(Macpherson 2012, p. 29)
Cognitive systems — which would be the source of the penetration —
are those responsible for such states as beliefs, desires, preferences, and
intentions. Note that cognition as opposed to perception is meant. Of
course, ‘cognitive’ is also often used in a way that includes perception, as
in the phrase ‘cognitive science.’ But the question is not whether some
system influences itself. (One might have spoken instead of higher cog-
nition or of conception.)1 The target of penetration would be percep-
tual experience, where ‘experience’ here indicates that phenomenally
conscious perceptual states are at issue. Note that this differs from
Pylyshyn’s own target: his primary concern is to argue that a signifi-
cant stage of visual processing — so-called early vision — is cognitively
impenetrable.
In developing the case for cognitive penetrability of perceptual ex-
perience, Macpherson appeals to several experiments that appear to
find color experience effects. Delk & Fillenbaum (1965) had partici-
pants match the color of two-dimensional orange-red cardboard cut-
outs to a color-adjustable background. Some of the cut-outs were
shaped like objects associated with red: hearts, lips, and apples. Others
were shaped like objects not associated with red: squares, bells, horse-
heads, etc. Their main result was that cut-outs with shapes associated
with red were color-matched to redder backgrounds than were cut-outs
with shapes not associated with red. Levin & Banaji (2006) produced
gray-scale images of faces with features stereotypical of black people
and with features stereotypical of white people. Images constructed to
be in fact identical in average luminance were deemed lighter if they
had features stereotypical of white people. Moreover, racially ambigu-
ous faces were deemed lighter if labeled ‘white’ than if labeled ‘black.’
Macpherson’s discussion focuses on these two papers. But she also men-
tions in a footnote work by Gegenfurtner and colleagues. (Macpherson
cites Hansen et al. 2006. See also Olkkonen et al. 2008, 2012; and
Witzel et al. 2011.) They had participants adjust a computer screen to
reduce to neutral gray both realistic images of color-associated objects
(e.g., bananas) and images of non-color-associated objects. Compared
to the grays to which non-color-associated objects were reduced, color-
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associated objects were reduced to a gray with greater color in a direc-
tion opposite that of their associated color. For instance, bananas were
reduced to a bluer gray. Gegenfurtner and colleagues interpret this
result as indicating that participants’ memories of color affected their
experience of the stimulus such that, at the gray point for non-color
associated objects, color-associated objects still appeared characteris-
tically colored to some extent (for example, the bananas still retained
some yellow to be grayed-out).
Macpherson argues that these results support the cognitive penetra-
bility of perceptual color experience, and she proposes a mechanism by
which such penetration might occur. The mechanism is multi-staged.
First, the perceived shape of the stimulus activates a belief that asso-
ciates the shape with a color — e.g., the belief that hearts are red.2 Sec-
ond, the activation of this belief generates non-perceptual phenomenal
visual imagery of the heart-shaped stimulus as red — non-perceptual
because generated in imagination.3 Third, this visual imagery inter-
acts with the phenomenal character of the participant’s visual experi-
ence so as to yield a redder color experience than the participant would
have had of a differently shaped stimulus.4 Macpherson supports her
proposed mechanism by arguing that independent evidence exists for
the second and third steps. In support of the second step, she cites
commonplace examples of imagination, dreams, and hallucinations in
which beliefs cause visual imagery. In support of the third step, she
cites the Perky effect, the incorporation of external stimuli into dreams
(e.g., one’s ringing alarm clock), and mixed perceptual and hallucina-
tory states (when one hallucinates something as being in the scene one
is otherwise veridically perceiving). The Perky effect (Perky 1910; Segal
1972) involves an unnoticed stimulus, just above perceptual threshold,
affecting subjects’ visual imagining. For example, some subjects, asked
to imagine a New York skyline while looking at a screen that was blank
except for an unnoticed just-above-threshold projection of a tomato,
described imagining New York at sunset.
In the next section, we argue that the experiments onwhichMacpher-
son relies do not provide strong grounds for the cognitive penetrability
of perceptual color experience. In the section after that, we raise a
problem, in any event, for Macpherson’s proposed mechanism.
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3. PROBLEMS WITH THE CASE FOR COLOR COGNITIVE
PENETRABILITY
The case for cognitive penetrability, based on the cited experiments, can
and has been challenged on various grounds. After reviewing some, we
will present further grounds based on experiments we carried out. (See
Machery, forthcoming, for a review of challenges to cognitive penetra-
bility results more generally. We mention here only those challenges
we have reason to refer back to later.)
For one, it is unclear whether the results reflect a difference in
perceptual experience, as opposed to perceptual (or, perception-based)
judgment. To be sure, when participants color-match, the case can seem
strong that results are based on their color experiences. But some of
these tasks are perceptually difficult — for example, Delk and Fillen-
baum had subjects peering through wax paper (intended both to blur
the edges between targets and background and to reduce visual acuity)
in a dimly lit room. The resulting perceptual ambiguity–concerning,
what’s more, colors that are borderline relative to participants’ color
categories — could render the colors difficult to discriminate and leave
room for perceptual judgment to affect performance. Moreover, Delk
and Fillenbaum did not have participants adjust background color them-
selves; instead, participants told experimenters what adjustments to
make. These verbal commands could activate semantic representations
of color. Finally, Zeimbekis (2013) suggests that Gegenfurtner and col-
leagues’ task is subject to an anchoring effect whereby the starting (con-
ventional) color modulates what shall count as gray on that trial. (Note
that the task does not involve matching two perceived colors, as in Delk
and Fillenbaum, but adjusting a stimulus’ color to what one considers
gray.) That perceptual judgment is subject to cognitive penetration is a
rather different claim from Macpherson’s (and uncontroversial).
There is another way, worth highlighting separately, that partici-
pants’ performance might reflect perceptual judgment. Claims of al-
leged cognitive penetrability have proven quite fragile when confronted
with the possibility of task compliance. Experimental tasks place partic-
ipants in a situation that encourages them to comply with the perceived
demands of the task. It is well-known that even an implicit concep-
tion of what the experiment is about can affect performance. (Orne
1962) The worry, then, is that just this may have occurred in the stud-
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ies Macpherson cites. Indeed, in a series of papers, Frank Durgin and
his students (e.g., Russell & Durgin 2008; Durgin et al. 2009 — in re-
sponse to Bhalla & Proffitt 1999) have demonstrated the effects of ex-
perimental demand specifically in tasks thought to demonstrate cogni-
tive penetrability of, or more generally top-down effects on, perceptual
experience. These demonstrations do not concern specifically the ex-
periments concerning color experience to which Macpherson appeals.
But they raise a worry more generally for cognitive penetrability claims
based on experiments that don’t carefully guard against task compli-
ance.5
Further, even if stored information associating shapes and colors
does affect perceptual experience of color, it doesn’t yet follow that there
is cognitive penetration. For not all top-down effects are cognitive pene-
tration: it matters where the information is stored, thus from where the
penetration comes. In particular, cognitive penetration requires that
the effect originate in beliefs, goals, and the like, not in associations
stored elsewhere — for example, in vision itself or in some other rel-
atively modularized system. Deroy (2012) and Bitter (2014) develop
this sort of objection in reply to Macpherson. That an effect is top-down
but not an instance of cognitive penetration, of course, does not drain
it of interest; but it is important to interpret correctly the nature of such
effects — indeed, all the more so, given their interest.6
Finally, we turn to the challenge that motivated our own experi-
ments. Firestone & Scholl (2014) suggest a strategy for testing top-
down claims generally, not just claims of cognitive penetrability. They
take their cue from a discredited hypothesis concerning El Greco’s elon-
gated figures (Firestone 2013)— viz., that they reflect visual distortions
owing to astigmatism. This hypothesis can’t be right, since, if astigma-
tism were the cause, it would likewise have distorted the visual ap-
pearance of the canvas on which El Greco was painting, cancelling out
the supposed effect. Similarly, Firestone and Scholl predict that, where
there’s a top-down effect, the effect should disappear if the means for
measuring the alleged effect are likewise subject to the effect. If instead
one continues to find an apparent perceptual distortion, then the par-
ticipant’s performance does not reflect a top-down effect after all, but
rather something else—perhaps task compliance.
For example, Stefanucci & Geuss (2009) found that holding a long
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pole horizontally makes apertures look narrower — or so they con-
cluded from participants’ performance. Firestone and Scholl first repli-
cated their result by having participants turn away from the aperture
and tell an experimenter how far to draw out a measuring tape so as to
equal the width of the aperture. They then repeated the experiment but
with the experimenter adjusting, not a measuring tape, but an aperture
just like the target participants had seen. Their prediction was that, had
there been a real top-down effect in the replication, the effect should
disappear in the second experiment (the aperture used for measure-
ment should likewise look narrower than it is). But the effect did not
disappear: participants holding the pole still matched the target aper-
ture to a narrower object of comparison than did participants without
the pole — in this case to an object of comparison that was an aperture
just like the target. This suggests that something else explains partic-
ipants’ performance—likely an effect on judgment, perhaps driven by
task compliance.
With this in mind, we attempted to apply Firestone and Scholl’s
strategy to results like those on which Macpherson bases her case. In
fact, we made two kinds of attempt. (For details, see below: Appendix,
Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2.) In the first, participants were presented
two shapes and instructed to indicate which was redder. The colors
ranged, in varying degrees across trials, from reddish-orange to red.
As for the shapes, there were three conditions: either both were not
characteristically red (e.g., bunny, oval), both were characteristically
red (e.g., heart, lips), or one was and the other wasn’t. Accuracy and
response times were recorded. If participants’ accuracy and response
times in the ‘one is/one isn’t’ condition and the ‘both are’ condition
agreed with each other but differed (in the right way) from those of
the ‘neither are’ condition, this would amount to a Firestone-Scholl-
type result. In the other attempt, we had participants color-match a
reddish-orange heart to one of two backgrounds. In the first condition,
the color-match was to the entire background screen; in the second, it
was to a larger heart. A Firestone-Scholl-type result would have both
exhibiting apparent top-down effects like those of Delk and Fillenbaum.
It turned out that our results do not raise a Firestone-Scholl-type
challenge. But nor do they support the conclusion that perceptual color
experience was cognitively penetrated or even just subject to top-down
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Color Experience Problems 8
effects. In fact they raise a more basic challenge. For unlike the case of
Firestone and Scholl’s examination of Stefanucci and Geuss’s results, we
failed to replicate the original results. Both experiments had attempts at
conceptual replication built-in; but, in each, participants’ performance
did not suggest that the characteristically red stimuli looked redder than
the stimuli that were not characteristically red. In the first experiment,
participants’ accuracy and response times differed only with the degree
of difference in the presented colors. They did not differ across the
three shape conditions. Moreover, participants’ performance when col-
ors were identical did not display any top-down effect. In ‘one is/one
isn’t’ trials with identical colors, participants were at chance in answer-
ing the forced-choice question: which is redder? In the second experi-
ment, participants in both conditions adjusted the background to a color
very close to the true one, with no bias towards red. It is particularly
striking that we failed to replicate in Experiment 1. With Experiment
2, it was at least possible for participants to correctly match the target’s
true color. But in Experiment 1, it was impossible for participants to
give a correct answer to the forced-choice question when colors were
in fact identical. Arguably, this provided added opportunity for a top-
down effect — even if only on perceptual judgment. Yet no significant
effect was found.
There are of course many reasons why an attempted replication
might fail. But it is worth noting that among the features that made
these experiments conceptual — not direct — replication attempts was
the use of computer screens rather than Delk and Fillenbaum’s card-
board cut-outs viewed in dim lighting through wax paper. We noted
earlier that this feature of Delk and Fillenbaum’s set-up has been ques-
tioned, at least insofar as one wishes to draw conclusions concerning
perceptual experience. Indeed, Macpherson (2012, p. 38, fn. 10) her-
self notes this feature and suggests that “. . . this detail is unimportant
for my discussion of the case. One can imagine the experiment being
repeated in modern conditions on a computer screen where such paper
would not be required.” But we carried out that experiment, and our
results suggest that perhaps it is not unimportant after all and that the
challenge has some support. Parallel remarks hold for our having had
participants adjust the background themselves instead of via instruc-
tions to an experimenter.
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Our results are consonant as well with a failure of conceptual repli-
cation found by Gegenfurtner’s group (Olkkonen et al. 2008). Their
gray-out effect mostly vanished when realistic images (photographs)
were replaced by uniformly, conventionally colored shapes that matched
the shape of the realistic image. (Cf. Machery forthcoming, who dis-
cusses more generally the problem of replication failure in studies of
cognitive penetrability.) Regarding their failure, however, it might be
replied that the replacements for at least some of the more realistic
stimuli no longer carried sufficient information to evoke the conven-
tional color. The replacement of their realistic image of an orange, for
example, would basically look like a uniformly orange disk. Interest-
ingly, Delk and Fillenbaum’s heart-shape has a direct association with
its conventional color driven entirely by border curvature.
That we did not demonstrate task compliance of course does not
mean there was none in the original Delk and Fillenbaum experiment.
Indeed, differences between our experiments and theirs could perhaps
explain our failure to produce a Firestone-Scholl-type result. For exam-
ple, participants in Experiment 2 were randomly assigned to just one
condition and performed their task in a significantly shorter time than
did Delk and Fillenbaum’s. The opportunity to discern the point of the
task was thus greatly reduced. In Experiment 1, the lack of a Firestone-
Scholl-type result (despite many participants guessing the point of the
experiment — see Appendix) could be owing to our not sufficiently in-
dicating which shape was the “target” being “measured” by the other
shape. But, because of the replication failure, we did not rerun the
experiment with this feature adjusted.
4. PROBLEMS FOR MACPHERSON’S PROPOSED MECHANISM
We turn now to Macpherson’s proposed mechanism. Suppose there is a
top-down effect. Does Macpherson’s proposed mechanism offer a plau-
sible account of how it might occur? We raise a worry concerning its re-
quired time-course: work on the generation of mental imagery suggests
it simply takes too long for Macpherson’s mechanism to be plausible.
Other work suggests shorter latencies for such top-down effects, but at
the cost of possibly undermining the claim of cognitive penetrability.
Macpherson’s proposed mechanism, recall, is that the shape of the
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stimulus activates a belief that relates that shape to a color; this causes
the generation of phenomenal visual imagery, which in turn interacts
with color experience generated directly from the stimulus to yield an
experience of color other than what one would have had without the
top-down effect. Recall also that Macpherson offers independent evi-
dence for the existence of the various stages taken individually: beliefs
causing visual imagery in imagination, dreaming, and hallucination;
and, for the interaction of non-perceptual visual imagery and percep-
tual experience, the Perky effect, the incorporation of external stimuli in
dreaming, and the placing of a hallucinated object in perceived space.
There is room to question howmuch support some of this evidence pro-
vides. For example, the causal direction in the Perky effect and in the
incorporation of external stimuli in dreaming is opposite to that needed
in her account of the cognitive penetrability of color experience. But
this is not our focus.
Macpherson’s mechanism has it that the distorted color experience
is produced by the interaction of two experiences: the perceptual color
experience generated directly by the stimulus and the non-perceptual
visual imagining generated indirectly via the representation of the stim-
ulus’ shape that activates the relevant shape-color belief. This means
that there are two causal pathways leading to the combined color ex-
perience. And these causal pathways may take different times to yield
their contributing experiential states. In particular, we should expect
the indirect path to take longer. The worry, then, is that we might ex-
pect participants to experience a change in color. For example, they
may first experience the heart as reddish-orange, given the faster direct
component, and then experience the heart as redder once the indirect
component arrives. But, as far as we are aware, participants do not
report any such change in color experience.
For this worry to be significant, two points about perceptual thresh-
olds must obtain. First, the difference between the reddish-orange and
the final redder color must be above the threshold for noticeable dif-
ference (similarly for other cases). Second, the temporal lag must be
sufficiently long to allow the subject to first see the one color and then
the other. That is, the lag must surpass a temporal threshold neces-
sary for perceiving the color change — i.e., necessary for the directly
generated color to be experienced prior to the phenomenal effect of
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imagination. There is in fact some reason to think both points obtain.
Regarding the first: Gegenfurtner and colleagues, on whom
Macpherson relies, themselves report that the distortion in color ex-
perience is significantly above perceptual threshold. More specifically,
they calculated a distortion effect approximately three to five times
greater than the minimum difference in color required for discrimina-
tion. (Hansen et al. 2006)
Regarding the second: Various results suggest (1) that the time
required to generate the visual imagining7 would on average exceed
1000ms, and (2) that this would allow participants to experience the
directly generated color first, before visual imagining has an effect. We
briefly review these results before turning to studies that might suggest
otherwise, but at the price of possibly removing the source of penetra-
tion from cognition.
Kosslyn et al. (1983, Experiment 3) had participants read descrip-
tions of and then study various 2-d geometrical line drawings. After
covering the drawing, participants were given a cue to construct a men-
tal image of it, pushing a key when the image was complete. Times
ranged from 1100-2200ms, depending on the complexity of the shape.
Arguably, a 2-d heart-shape is not relevantly simpler than Kosslyn et al.’s
simplest shapes — a thick cross, a triangle embedded in a triangle, and
two over-lapping squares. Weber and Harnish (1974, Experiment II)
had similar results in a task that required generating an orthographic
image of a word from a spoken stimulus. Prior to the stimulus, par-
ticipants were given a number corresponding to letter position. They
then had to report whether the letter imagined in that position was
vertically large or not (e.g., ‘b’ vs. ‘a’). Average response times ranged
from 1040-1350ms, depending on the cued position. Finally, Brock-
mole et al. (2002) presented a partially filled 4×4 grid to participants
who then, at variable times after offset, had to integrate a mental image
formed on the basis of that grid with another perceptually presented to
them, so as to determine which grid position was left empty after in-
tegration. They calculated that the amount of information available in
the mental image plateaus at 1300ms, suggesting that 1300ms is re-
quired to completely form the image. These three experiments differ
in various ways, not least in the content of their imagery. Still, they
suggest that 1000ms is a plausible lower bound for the average time of
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imagery formation.
Would this duration enable participants to experience the directly
generated color first? Despite theorists’ differing views of perceptual
consciousness, we can arrive at a reasonable estimate of the time-course
of color experience. Prinz (2012, p. 88), who considers intermediate-
level representations modulated by attention sufficient for conscious-
ness, cites Plendl et al. (1993) for the claim that intermediate-level vi-
sual areas respond to color by 100ms and work by Connor et al. (2004)
that records (physiologically) the activation of attention to color by
125ms. Lamme (2003), who identifies the core neural correlates of con-
sciousness with the presence of recurrent processing in areas supporting
early perception, and Dehaene et al. (2006), who argue that percep-
tual consciousness further requires activation of, e.g., prefrontal areas,
agree that visual consciousness occurs within 200-300ms of stimulus
onset. Thus, if one uses the latencies given above, 700ms (=1000ms-
300ms) constitutes a conservative lower estimate of the time-lag be-
tween perceptual color consciousness and the formation of mental im-
agery that would occur in Delk and Fillenbaum’s task. This lag would
be plausibly more than sufficient for participants to notice a change in
color, assuming the difference in color was itself sufficiently large.8
Note that this estimate is conservative, not only because of the
bounds on which it’s based, but also because it ignores other possi-
ble sources of time-lag. Participants need first to generate the (not
necessarily yet conscious) shape representation that, second, activates
the concept HEART and then the belief that hearts are red. Only then
does the clock start ticking on the generation, from that, of the visual
imagining. Further, the interaction of the visual imagining and the di-
rectly generated perceptual color experience might itself require some
time. But while these may indeed increase a lag already plausibly above
threshold, we are conservative here in part because the mental imagery
time-course results cited above arguably also include other elements.
The time-lag might also be lengthened if color is processed in per-
ception more quickly than shape. Indeed, our Experiment 3 suggests
just this (though cf. Viviani & Aymoz 2001). Participants were trained
to press one key for certain shapes and for certain colors and to press an-
other key for other shapes and colors. They were then presented colors
without shapes (swaths without blackened borders) and shapes with-
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out colors. They were also presented stimuli that combined shape and
color. Some of these combined stimuli were congruent (the shape and
color were associated with the same key); others were incongruent. Re-
garding incongruent stimuli, some participants were instructed to press
the key associated with the shape, others the key associated with the
color. Average response times for colors were significantly faster than
those for shapes. This suggests that Macpherson’s indirect pathway —
from shape representation to an effect via belief and imagination on
color experience — may already start with a temporal disadvantage
compared to the direct pathway. Interestingly, average response times
with incongruent stimuli trended faster for participants instructed to
use color association than for participants instructed to use shape as-
sociation—albeit just beyond statistical significance (p = .06), perhaps
owing to our smallish sample size. (Also, all but one of the former
had faster reaction times than any of the latter.) If such a result could
be established, this would suggest that color also dominates shape in
perception. This would be of interest because Delk and Fillenbaum’s
reddish-orange hearts could be construed as (slightly) incongruent rel-
ative to the conventional association of heart-shapes with the color red.
Thus, a top-down effect driven by this association would need to be suf-
ficiently powerful to overcome the dominance of shape by color.
There is a potentially relevant difference, however, between the
visual imagery considered in the cited literature and that invoked by
Macpherson’s mechanism. The results above concern visual imagery
that was generated voluntarily, intentionally, and consciously. (Perhaps
not in the Weber and Harnish experiment, but let’s suppose so to be
concessive.) The imagery invoked by Macpherson’s model would be
generated involuntarily and unconsciously — cf. Macpherson (2012,
p. 55). Its product might be conscious, but there would be no con-
scious intention to produce it, nor would one be conscious of the prod-
uct as an imagining or conscious of the producing of it as imagining.
Conscious, deliberate mental activity tends generally to be slower and
more effortful than involuntary, unconscious activity — as emphasized,
for example, in the dual processing literature (Evans & Frankish 2008;
Kahneman 2011). Macpherson could thus reply that the involuntary
mental imagery her cases involve might possess a significantly shorter
time-course than voluntary mental imagery.
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Involuntary mental imagery has been much less explored than vol-
untary mental imagery. But there do exist studies that might bear on
the question of time-course. Schlack & Albright (2007), for exam-
ple, trained rhesus monkeys to associate motion direction and static
shapes. In this case, motion-sensitive neurons in cortical area MT be-
came shape-selective as well, with similar latencies for each feature.
In this case (given the neurons they targeted and the analysis-window
they accordingly selected), the latencies were no shorter than 580ms,
significantly shorter than our 1000ms lower bound. Following Sakai
& Miyashita (1991), Schlack and Albright suggest that the associative
learning induces connectivity betweenmotion- and shape-sensitive neu-
rons, so that the motion-sensitive neurons’ shape-selectivity is a top-
down effect whereby the perception of the relevant shape generates
motion imagery. The time-course from shape perception to the ac-
tivation of motion-sensitive neurons would be no doubt significantly
shorter than 580ms.
Do such results support Macpherson’s mechanism? There are sev-
eral grounds for caution. First, while it is not the interpretation they
favor, Schlack and Albright point out that their results could involve the
co-opting of MT-neurons for shape processing rather than a top-down
influence of existing shape-sensitivity. Second, it is unclear that the
shape-sensitivity in MT amounts to conscious imagery. Third, it would
be a major step (one not considered or taken by Schlack and Albright)
to conclude, even if there is a top-down generation of conscious im-
agery, that the learned association is cognitive — for example, a belief
that that motion and that shape often co-occur (even assuming rhesus
monkeys are capable of belief). It’s notable that Schlack and Albright,
in supporting their favored interpretation, advert to Freyd (1987) on
representational momentum (our tendency to misperceive a moving
object as slightly further along in its trajectory). Finke & Freyd (1989)
reject the suggestion that representational momentum involves cogni-
tive penetrability, in part owing to the rapidity of the effect. They take
the phenomenon to occur within perception itself. Such a reply is avail-
able regarding other cases of involuntary imagery as well. Printed stim-
uli, for example, can generate phonological representations in skilled
readers within 45ms, suggesting that phonological imagery would not
lag much behind visual phenomenology. (Orden & Kloos 2005) But it
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is reasonable to maintain that this reflects the workings of an acquired
modular capacity — or at least not penetration by belief.
Macpherson’s mechanism thus arguably faces a dilemma: Insofar as
the penetration genuinely comes from belief, there is a worry that it re-
quires an implausible time-course; whereas insofar as the time-course
does not raise problems, it may be implausible that the alleged top-
down effect counts as cognitive. This certainly does not constitute a
knock-down argument. We have not argued that there could not be in-
voluntary imagery originating in belief; indeed, some intrusive imagery
suggests otherwise. It remains to be shown, however, that involuntary
imagery originating in belief would have an appropriate time-course.
Our considerations present a prima facie challenge.
We note, finally, that even if the effect in Delk and Fillenbaum’s par-
ticular experiment was owing to involuntary non-perceptual imagery,
the distinct pathways of Macpherson’s proposedmechanismwould prima
facie seem to allow the non-perceptual imagery to be initiated volun-
tarily and deliberately, in ways that would not involve the targeted
stimulus itself. For example, the non-perceptual imagery could arise
in response to an experimenter’s request to imagine that the stimulus is
red.9 Because the initiation would be independent of the stimulus, the
shape wouldn’t matter: reddish-orange squares should thus look red-
der in such cases as well. This prediction could presumably be tested.
Though we did not attempt such a test ourselves, we doubt it would
yield an effect (even if the original effect were replicated). After all,
one needn’t wait upon an experimenter’s request: look at something
and then see if you can make your experienced color shift by imagining
the thing to be a different color. If our hunch is correct, Macpherson
would need to explain why the effect is only found with involuntary
imagining. (Cf. Macpherson 2012, p. 58.) It is unclear how such an
explanation would run if the involuntary imagery stemmed from color
beliefs.
5. CONCLUSION
Perceptual experience may indeed be cognitively penetrable — perhaps
in ways and to extents that matter for questions of justification, ob-
jectivity, and normative social theory. But we have argued that argu-
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ments from “one particularly difficult case to account for by those who
don’t believe that cognitive penetration of perceptual experience can
take place” (Macpherson 2012, p. 59) should be treated with caution.
The effect is not readily replicated — at least not without changes that
would strengthen other grounds for skepticism.
We have also raised worries for Macpherson’s intriguing proposal
concerning the mechanism by which such cognitive penetration might
occur. Our time-course considerations do not rule out an indirect path
through mental imagery, but they do indicate what sort of further sup-
port the proposal would need. They thus point in a constructive di-
rection if the cognitive penetration of color experience can indeed be
established.10
APPENDIX
Experiment 1A
Method
Task
Each participant performed a color comparison task whereby they indi-
cated which of the two stimuli presented simultaneously on each trial
was redder than the other. Participants had unlimited time to respond
by either pressing ‘z’ on standard keyboard if they thought the left fig-
ure was redder or ‘m’ if the right. A 2s grating mask screen with high
spatial frequency was inserted in between trials to remove any lingering
visual after-effects. After the experiment, a survey questionnaire was
administered to the participants probing their awareness of the exper-
iment’s hypothesis.
Stimuli
Similar but slightly different from those used in the original Delk &
Fillenbaum (1965)’s experiment, stimuli were ten pictures with col-
ors ranging from red to reddish-orange. Five had characteristically
red (henceforth CR) shapes (heart, apple, lips, fire extinguisher, stop
sign), while the other five had shapes that are not characteristically red
(henceforth NCR) (bunny, mushroom, bell, pentagon, oval). This led
to three task conditions: those with two CR shapes, two NCR shapes,
or one CR and one NCR shape. All stimuli had approximately the same
Vol. 9: Perception and Concepts
17 Steven Gross et al.
surface areas.
Each of the ten figures could appear with any of the 15 color shades,
which were created by adjusting the hue value (keeping the brightness
and saturation constant) on the color wheel feature of Adobe Photo-
shop CS2. These 15 hue values were 0◦ (RGB 255-0-0), 6◦, 10◦, 11◦,
12◦, 13◦, 14◦, 15◦, 16◦, 17◦, 18◦, 19◦, 20◦, 21◦, and 22◦. (We skipped
1◦-5◦ and 7◦-9◦ to avoid making the task too difficult. Our intuition
and pilot data revealed that it was much more difficult to distinguish
between two extremely red pictures. In fact, preliminary data revealed
that performance on such trials was at chance level.) Relabeling these
hue values as 1◦-15◦ according to their respective order, we associ-
ated these colors with the shapes such that there would be 1◦, 2◦, 3◦,
or 4◦ degree of hue difference between any two figures in a stimulus
pair. A complete set of stimuli conditions (2,750) was then created by
combining total number of possible shape pairs (55) with total number
of possible hue pairs (50). Two complete sets consisting of 5,500 were
divided among 25 subjects such that each participant completed 220
trials in an experiment.
Figure 1: 1 CR (a) and NCR (b) cutouts used in the experiment.
Participants
25 JHU undergraduate students with age ranging from 17-24 partici-
pated in the experiment for a course credit. All had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. None were colorblind. The procedure for this and all
experiments reported was approved by the JHU IRB.
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Experimental Setting
The experiment was conducted using Psychopy Builder Software
v.1.80.01 (Peirce 2009) on a 2010 13” MacBook Pro LCD Display with
a spatial resolution of 1280 × 800 pixels.
Results
Performance Accuracy
ANOVA analysis reveals no significant difference in error rate across
the three main conditions: CR-NCR, CR-CR, and NCR-NCR (p>0.1).
Within the CR-NCR condition, t-test analysis reveals no significant dif-
ference between ‘critical trials’ (trials where participants indicated that
CR cutouts were redder when in fact the opposite was true) and ‘re-
verse critical trials’ (participants indicated NCR as being redder when
the opposite was true) (p>0.5; mean error rate= 0.31 and 0.33 respec-
tively). Using ANOVA and pairwise comparison test with Bonferroni ad-
justment, we however found significant difference across all degrees of
hue difference (1◦, 2◦, 3◦, 4◦) that could exist between any two stimuli
(p<0.01).
Reaction Time
Reaction time data shows similar patterns. No significant effect of char-
acteristic redness was found across the three main conditions (p>0.5)
or across the critical vs. reverse critical trials (p>0.1). In contrast to
error rate data, no significant RT difference was found among different
levels of trial difficulty (p>0.5).
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Survey Questionnaire
10 out of 25 participants correctly guessed the hypothesis of the exper-
iment. A guess was counted as correct if it made the slightest mention
of association with redness of CR stimuli. To our knowledge, previous
experiments like this one, including that of Delk and Fillenbaum, did
not probe participants to determine if they had guessed the hypothesis.
(Levin and Banaji informed participants in advance of the point of their
experiment.)
Experiment 1B
Experiment 1A did not contain any trials in which true colors were iden-
tical. The smallest difference in hue was just 1◦ (in Adobe Photoshop).
It’s not unlikely that this difference was smaller than the effect calcu-
lated by Gegenfurtner and colleagues (three to five times greater than
the minimum difference required for discrimination — see Hansen et
al. 2006). If so, then Experiment 1A contained a conceptual replication
failure. To be sure, however, we ran Experiment 1B which included tri-
als with identical true colors.
Method
Similar to experiment 1, except the hue differences between any two
figures in a stimuli pair were now 0◦, 1◦, 2◦, and 3◦. In addition, only
one complete set of 2,750 trials (plus an extra 110 trials) was divided
among 13 volunteer participants (aged 21-50), such that each com-
pleted 220 trials.
Results
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Performance Accuracy
ANOVA analysis reveals a significant difference among the three
main conditions (p<0.01). However, this significant difference was
attributable to participants’ superior performance in the NCR-NCR
condition over the other two conditions (rather than inferior perfor-
mance in the CR-NCR). Pairwise comparison tests after Bonferroni
adjustment show significant difference between NCR-NCR and CR-NCR
(p=0.005), and between NCR-NCR and CR-CR (p<0.05), but not
between CR-NCR and CR-CR (p>0.1). More importantly, in the CR-
NCR trials where there is no hue difference between the two cutouts
(0◦ trials), participants did not significantly choose one cutout over
the other (p=0.1). As with Experiment 1A, no significant difference
was found across the critical vs. reverse critical condition for the 1◦,
2◦ and 3◦ trials (p>0.1). Significant drop in performance, however,
was found as the task became increasingly difficult (p<0.01).
Reaction Time
RTs of Experiment 1B replicated those of 1A. No significant RT differ-
ence was found across main conditions (p>0.5), task difficulty levels
(p>0.5), or critical vs. reverse critical trials (p>0.1). Participants did
not take significantly longer time to choose one shape over the other in
the 0◦ trials (p>0.1).
Survey Questionnaire
12/13 participants correctly guessed the hypothesis of the experiment.
Experiment 2
Method
Task
Each participant was randomly assigned one of two different tasks. In
the ‘Replication’ task, participants performed a task analogous to that
of the original Delk & Fillenbaum (1965) study but on a computer mon-
itor. They were presented with a small reddish orange heart on top of a
colored display (Fig. 2A) and instructed to change the color of the back-
ground using the right and left arrow keys until its color was identical
to that of the center foreground heart (see color details below).
In the ‘El Greco’ task, participants performed the exact same task
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but, instead of changing the color of the background of thewhole screen,
they changed the color of a bigger background heart displayed behind
the smaller foreground heart (Fig. 2B). The bigger background heart
was presented on top of a grey background that filled the remaining
empty space in the display.
Figure 2: Sample displays from ’Replication’ task (A) and ’El Greco’
task (B). See text for details.
Colors
The colors used for the background and foreground hearts were taken
from a continuum of HSV colors converted to RGB values using the
hsv2rgb function from MATLAB Psychtoolbox v3.0.10. The contin-
uum was constructed by setting the V and S values fixed (S=0.7990,
V=204.0) and then varying the H value from 0.9 to 1.0 and then from
0.0 to 0.1 in intervals of .001. (These values were taken from color
wheels used elsewhere in the color working memory literature — e.g.,
Emrich and Ferber 2012. S and V values were kept constant across all
colors insofar as the computer color rendering is faithful to these val-
ues — see Bae et al. 2014.) This yielded a continuum of colors that
spanned from pink to orange (Fig. 3). These colors were the ones sub-
jects cycled through when pressing the left and right arrow keys. What
is typically considered standard ‘red’ — defined here as the H value re-
turned by the rgb2hsv function for the RGB triplet of pure red ([1 0 0])
— is at the middle at the H value of 0, depicted in Fig. 3 by the left
triangle.
The color used for the foreground heart, following the method of
Delk and Fillenbaum, was a reddish-orange hue, arbitrarily determined
to be significantly more orange than true red but not so much that it
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was saliently distinguishable from red. Because of the limitations of
the colors that can be produced on a computer monitor, we could not
replicate the original study’s colors exactly. The color of the foreground
square can be seen in the right triangle in Fig. 3.
As is visible from Fig. 2, we included a dark grey outline around
the heart to simulate the fact that in the original study there was an
actual physical distance between the foreground and the background
and hence a possible shadow to define the edges of the foreground. If
this outline was not introduced, pilot data showed that the task was in
fact trivial and participants easily achieved perfect performance on the
task.
The color of the background heart in the ‘El Greco’ experiment and
of the entire background in the ‘Replication’ experiment was set to start
at a random color above or below the true color of the foreground heart.
Whether it was above or below was counterbalanced across subjects,
but was fixed to be at least 20 color values away from the true fore-
ground color in the randomly assigned direction. The grey background
in the ‘El Greco’ experiment was RGB = [125 125 125].
Figure 3: Continuum of colors used in the experiment. Right triangle
is the true color of the foreground heart. Left triangle is ’true’ red.
Participants
10 participants were tested on the ‘El Greco’ experiment and 9 partic-
ipants on the ‘Replication’ experiment. Ages ranged from 16-40 years
of age and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision with no color
blindness. Each participant performed either the ‘El Greco’ or the ‘Repli-
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cation’ experiment once, performing only a single trial.
Computer Monitor
Both experiments were administered on a 2009 15” MacBook Pro LCD
Display with a spatial resolution of 1440 × 900 pixels.
Results
The main finding was that participants were in general very good at
the task, always selecting a color close to the true one, with no system-
atic bias. A two-tailed t-test showed that the mean color response did
not significantly differ from the foreground heart’s true color in either
experiment (p > .05 for both). Because the ‘Replication’ experiment
did not replicate the pattern of results from the original study, it is not
surprising that we did not observe the expected pattern of results in the
‘El Greco’ version.
Figure 4: Mean response color for each experiment. Error bars reflect
95% confidence interval. Red line is the true color of the foreground
heart (i.e. the "correct answer").
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Experiment 3
Method
Participants
10 participants, aged 22 to 31 years old, participated in the Color vs.
Shape task. Five participants were randomly assigned to the “Shape
Trump” condition and five participants were randomly assigned to the
“Color Trump” condition. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision with no color blindness.
Stimuli
All images were presented on a 13” MacBook Pro using Psychopy soft-
ware. (Peirce 2008)
The “shape only” stimuli consisted of black outlines of circles, dia-
monds, triangles, and squares. There was no fill for the “shape only”
stimuli, which resulted in the appearance of a white shape on a white
background. All “shape only” stimuli were adjusted to be approximately
the same size on the laptop screen (approximately 4” by 4”).
The “color only” stimuli consisted of rectangular color swaths of
green, red, blue, and yellow that did not have any outline. The swath
measured 5” by 2” on the laptop screen. The green swath had an RGB
value of 0-204-0; the red swath had a RGB value of 255-0-0; the blue
swath had an RGB value of 0-0-255; the yellow swath had an RGB value
of 255-255-0.
The colored shapes, or combined stimuli, were made from combin-
ing the colors from the swaths with the outlines from the shape stimuli.
These combined stimuli were colored and had distinct black outlines to
designate them as colored shapes as opposed to the color swaths.
Participants were explicitly told before starting the experiment that
they would see shapes (black and white, outlined shapes), colors (rect-
angular swaths with no outline) and colored shapes (colored shapes
outlined in black) in the experiment. They were instructed that the
rectangle of color was not one of the target shapes, and that only the
four outlined shapes that were practiced (circles, diamonds, triangles,
and squares) denoted shape stimuli.
Task
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: either
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the “Shape Trump” condition or the “Color Trump” condition. All sub-
jects sat in a quiet room to participate in and were given a 13” MacBook
Pro on which to complete the experiment. The experimenter remained
in the room the entire time to explain the experiment and answer any
questions that the participant may have had during the experiment.
Participants were given written and spoken instructions that they
were going to play a game with two rules — a shape rule and a color
rule — and that their responses would be based on these two rules. Par-
ticipants were instructed to make their responses as quickly as possible,
while still being accurate.
First, all participants learned the “shape” rule, where they were in-
structed to press “z” when they saw either a circle or diamond and press
“m” when they saw a triangle or square. Participants then practiced the
shape rule in isolation for 20 trials.
Next, all participants learned the “color” rule, where they were in-
structed to press “z” when they saw either a green or red color swath,
and press “m” when they saw a blue or yellow color swath. Participants
then practiced the color rule in insolation for 20 trials.
Then, participants were instructed that they were going to need to
combine the two rules to finish playing the game. They were told that
they would see plain shapes (and use the shape rule to respond), plain
color swaths (and use the color rule to respond), and colored shapes.
For the consistent colored shapes (e.g. a green circle), participants were
told to respond according to the previously learned rules. For the in-
consistent colored shapes (e.g. blue circle), participants in the Shape
Trump condition were instructed to respond using the learned shape
rule. In other words, the shape rule would always trump the color rule
for inconsistent stimuli. Participants in the Color Trump condition were
instructed to respond using the learned color rule for inconsistent stim-
uli. In other words, the color rule would always trump the shape rule
for inconsistent stimuli.
The combined stimuli (shape only, color only, and colored shapes)
were presented randomly to the participants, who were reminded to
respond as quickly as possible while still being accurate. Each individ-
ual image was shown a total of three times, for a total of 72 trials: 12
shape only stimuli, 12 color only stimuli, 24 congruent colored shapes,
24 incongruent colored shapes.
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Results
Shape and Color Isolation Trials
Because all participants learned and completed trials for both the shape
only and color only rules in the exact same way, the data from both
Shape Trump condition participants and Color Trump condition partic-
ipants were combined for the analysis of the shape vs. color isolation
data. For all participants, the average number of correct responses for
the shape-only stimuli was 19 out of 20 trials (SD = 0.82) and the aver-
age number of correct responses for the color-only stimuli was 19.2 out
of 20 trials (SD= 1.32). These averages did not differ significantly from
chance. The average reaction time for the shape-only stimuli was 0.98
seconds (SD = 0.35), while the average reaction time for the color-only
stimuli was 0.68 seconds (SD = 0.24). These reaction times are statisti-
cally different from each other (p = 0.03) suggesting that participants’
reaction times were significantly faster for the color-only stimuli than
the shape-only stimuli.
Shape Trump vs. Color Trump Conditions
Baseline responses for shape-only and color-only stimuli were excluded
from analyses since they did not reflect any sort of combination of rules
in the game, and these trials were duplicates of the shape-only and
color-only data reported above. Within the Color Trump and Shape
Trump conditions, congruent and incongruent trials were collapsed to-
gether into combined stimuli. This was done to get a more general
picture of participants’ performance within each condition.
On average, participants in the Color Trump condition got 46.8 out
of 48 trials correct (SD = 0.84), and participants in the Shape Trump
condition answered correctly for an average of 43 out of 48 trials (SD
= 5.83). These averages did not differ significantly from each other (p
= 0.19); however, this may have been due to an outlier in the Shape
Trump condition that strongly influenced the standard deviation. The
trend suggests that the number of correct responses in the Color Trump
condition is likely to be greater than the number of correct responses
in the Shape Trump condition.
The average reaction time for participants in the Color Trump con-
dition was 1.11 seconds (SD = 0.36), and the average reaction time
for participants in the Shape Trump condition was 1.74 seconds (SD =
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0.52). Although these reaction times did not quite differ significantly
from each other (p= 0.056), the trend again suggests that, the reaction
times of the participants in the Color Trump condition are likely faster
than the reaction times of participants in the Shape Trump condition.
Restricted to incongruent trials, the average reaction time for par-
ticipants in the Color Trump condition was 1.11 seconds (SD = 0.84),
and the average reaction time for participants in the Shape Trump con-
dition was 1.76 seconds (SD = 1.52). Again, the reaction times did
not quite differ significantly from each other (p = 0.06). But, in ad-
dition to the trend in average reaction times, it was also the case that
all but one of the participants in the Color Trump condition had faster
reaction times than participants in the Shape Trump condition. Perhaps
this could suggest that color dominates shape in perception.
Notes
1We won’t take up how best to characterize the perception-conception distinction. Cf.
Burge (2010). Some such distinction is required for the question of cognitive penetrabil-
ity even to arise, at least as standardly formulated.
2In laying out her model, Macpherson concentrates on steps two and three, not men-
tioning step one — but presumably only because it’s so obvious. There’s perhaps a ques-
tion whether the perceived shape of the stimulus alone activates the belief. Perhaps the
perceived color of the stimulus plays a role as well. (This needn’t be a conscious color
perception. But if it were, this would add grist to the mill for our time-course worry.)
Delk and Fillenbaum’s stimuli were not red, but reddish-orange. But perhaps a color
sufficiently similar to the associated color is required to generate the effect. This could
be tested by seeing whether white heart-shapes, for example, have a pinker appearance
than white squares. Note that Gegenfurtner and colleagues’ interpretation of their result
suggests that the effect should obtain for gray. Even if a sufficiently similar color is not
necessary, however, it could still play a role.
3When we speak of a mental image, we shall always mean something with phenom-
enal character, i.e. conscious (experiential). We follow Macpherson (2012, p. 50-1) in
counting the states thus generated in imagination as non-perceptual.
4Macpherson (2012, pp. 50, fn. 16, and 51-2) suggests that, rather than posit two
interacting phenomenal states (one perceptual, one not), we might posit one phenome-
nal perceptual state that results from the interaction of vision and imagination. As we’ll
see, this does not affect our time-course argument. Macpherson’s reason for suggesting
this way of characterizing things is that “it doesn’t seem plausible to suggest subjects are
aware of two states or two phenomenal characters.” But her own examples — mentioned
presently in the main text —might indicate that one can be in two such states without
being aware of it. Note, by the way, that it’s crucial that the resulting state be a phe-
nomenal perceptual state. It does not establish the cognitive penetration of perceptual
experience to show that cognition can generate a non-perceptual phenomenal state that
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Color Experience Problems 28
co-occurs with a perceptual phenomenal state—even if the subject of the non-perceptual
state confuses it for a perceptual state. The cognitive penetration of visual imagination
is not a controversial claim (cf. Macpherson 2012, p. 51).
5It’s important that the perceived task demand affect perceptual judgment—or at least
not perceptual experience. Otherwise, one might conclude that task compliance is itself
a form of cognitive penetrability. Studies that seemed to unmask top-down claims would
then rather have simply eliminated the top-down effects, not shown them to have been
absent in the original experiments.
6Given the particular reasons Levin and Banaji’s claims are of interest, it’s worth men-
tioning a further worry about their results — viz., that it seems their stimuli were not in
fact uniform in their actual color features. To yield identical average luminance, Levin
and Banaji of necessity created local differential shading across their face-stimuli, which
could affect perceptions and judgments of lightness. Firestone and Scholl (forthcoming)
have now verified that the resulting low-level perceptual effects account for Levin and
Banaji’s results.
7Or to generate the total phenomenal state that incorporates the phenomenal contri-
bution of imagination — see n. 4 above.
8Indeed, we considered testing whether participants could notice color differences
three to five times above threshold introduced into stimuli 700-1500ms after onset. But
the psychologists considered a positive result too obvious for it to be worth thus utilizing
our limited resources.
9The voluntary imagery’s effect in such an experiment would have to be confined to the
experience of the stimulus, so that the experienced background color is not also affected
— as perhaps it could be were the experimenter to request simply that one imagine red.
Similarly, Macpherson’s account of Delk and Fillenbaum’s results must involve, not just
the generation of red imagery, but imagery that affects only the experienced color of the,
e.g., heart-shaped stimuli, not also that of the background. Cf. Macpherson (2012, p.
51).
10This paper grew out of projects in Gross and Flombaum’s course on “Thought and
Perception.” Our thanks to the other course participants. Thanks also to Gi-Yeul Bae,
Joel Pearson, Brenda Rapp, and Robert Wiley. Special thanks to Fiona Macpherson for
the stimulation of her wonderfully thorough and pellucid paper. Finally, thanks to Jurgis
Skilters and the other organizers of the excellent Riga conference.
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